Battle of Baton Rouge: A Swirling Melee

by Daniel O’Connor

The Battle of Baton Rouge was a swirling melee. The darkness, fog, noise, and close combat stretched the limits of command and control for an army of this time. Well established plans fell apart almost immediately in the confusion. The initial Confederate attack was intended to be a collective effort by all four brigades.

Confederate Col. Henry Watkins Allen’s brigade, however, became preoccupied by Union Capt. John Corden’s isolated party on the far Confederate left. Although they gained their initial objective, their success could not be maintained after the loss of Allen. When Allen’s men were punished and beaten back by the much smaller enemy force, a significant manpower loss was felt by the main Confederate effort. When Colonel Breaux was unable to rally the remnants of Allen’s brigade, Confederate Col. A.P. Thompson’s men took on the whole burden of the fight south of Greenwell Springs Road alone. The piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks by the three active Confederate brigades that followed did not allow them to place the full weight of their combat power on the Union defense at the same time.

Another problem faced by the Confederate commanders was a lack of artillery support. The early loss of two guns by Cobb’s battery placed them in an even greater artillery deficit. The burden of support for the main effort at Greenwell Springs Road fell on Semmes’ Battery. Although Ruggles displayed a fine sense of tactical necessity in the movement of these guns, there was simply not enough artillery to go around.

The early deployment of the 21st Indiana by Lt. John Keith set the tone for the battle from the very outset. This would be a fight for every inch. Union Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams never brought all his units into the fight. Fortunately for Williams, the late introduction of reinforcements and the naval gunfire proved decisive. [Overall, Williams wasn’t very fortunate, as he was killed in the battle.]

There is debate over who won the Battle of Baton Rouge. In regards to objectives gained or lost, the tactical decision would have to go the Union forces. Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s goal was to capture the city but he did not. Although Williams’ defense was strained to the last, it managed to accomplish its goal: the city was saved [for the Union].

Strategic victory would certainly be a different story. While the Federals managed to hang on to Baton Rouge, it offered them no real benefit. Tactically defeated, Breckinridge won the strategic prize in retreat: Port Hudson.

In the end, the battle for Baton Rouge should never have been fought at all. From the very beginning, Confederate Major Gen. Earl Van Dorn’s subordinates disagreed with the campaign. Breckinridge and Clark both argued that the city even if gained could not be defended. They agreed with Sterling Price that the object of the most interest to the Confederate cause was Port Hudson.

The occupation of Baton Rouge held no real value to the Union cause either. They should have seen the importance of Port Hudson and beaten the Confederates to the punch there. Realizing the drain that Baton Rouge put on their resources, the city was abandoned. Both sides could have had what they ultimately ended up with without a bloodletting.

Editor’s Note: Union losses  at Baton Rouge were 383 (84 dead, 266 wounded, and 33 missing). Confederate losses were 456 (84 dead, 315 wounded, and 57 missing)

©2012 by Daniel O’Connor.  Printed with permission of CivilWarTalk.com